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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to explore Academic Staff Governor (ASG) 
roles at three further education colleges in England. Uniquely, 
the research focuses on ASG activities, the understanding of 
ASG roles, and aspects of the role that can be reimagined, 
which may be of benefit to practising governors, particularly 
ASGs such as further education (FE) teacher governors. The 
study draws upon relevant literature to identify concepts 
related to governors’ roles and activities. An interpretivist 
stance is used to collect predominantly qualitative data 
through a combined methods approach, and to engage with 
ASGs and external governors. During fieldwork, qualitative 
and quantitative evidence was analysed from semi-structured 
interviews, questionnaire responses, observations of 
governance meetings and governance documents. Findings 
suggest that ASGs’ insiderness, their affiliation with other 
groups and decision-making circumstances may influence 
their governing activities. Activities rooted in operational 
settings such as professional-information giving were highly 
valued by other governors, while there were uncertainties 
about the benefit of having managerial staff as ASGs. There 
was evidence indicating uncertainty among the college staff 
regarding the role of an ASG in the colleges’ boards. As a result 
of the study, to conceptualise an ASG’s role in FE colleges, ‘The 
3 RaPs (Roles as Position/Perceived/Practice) Framework’ for 
an ASG’s role has been developed. The research recommends 
clear and specific role descriptions for ASG posts; action 
to allow more opportunities for ASGs to act as governors 
in order to transform the scope of the role. Finally, several 
recommendations are set out in order to address ASGs’ 
insiderness, to promote ASGs’ professional profiles in the FE 
sector and to improve the methodological approach for use 
in similar future research.
Introduction
At a time when research into further education (FE) College governance con-
tinues to be sparse, this paper presents the results of a study into Academic Staff 
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Governor (ASG) roles in the governance of three colleges in England. All three 
colleges had been graded as ‘Outstanding’ in the most recent two inspections by 
the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) – the 
state’s quality control authority. The research project conducted from 2011–2015 
studied ASG role activities. It explored how well the role is understood within 
the colleges’ governing bodies (corporation boards) and in what ways the role 
can be reimagined to give ASGs a fuller role in governance. The specific research 
questions were as follows:
(1)  What are an ASG’s general governance and ASG role-specific activities 
in the governance of the three colleges?
(2)  What are the issues around the understanding of ASGs’ role in the gov-
ernance of the three colleges?
(3)  In what ways can the role be reimagined to expand the role of ASGs?
Academic discussions in various education sectors outside FE and across geo-
graphical boundaries have highlighted the crucial role of academic staff in edu-
cational governance (MacNeill, Silcox, and Cavanagh 2003; Sallis 2006; Shattock 
2002). However, recent changes at policy level in England arguably presented a 
worrying development for any teacher in FE who aspires to secure an ASG role 
in FE governance. The replacement of the reference to ‘teaching’ staff governors 
in the Education Act 2011 (HMSO 2011) with a generic reference using ‘staff ’ 
governors means academics’ place in FE governing boards is not guaranteed any 
more. Hence, there is a need to understand the roles ASGs currently play and to 
reconceptualise the role. Calls for reform in overall FE governance have already 
been made by Gleeson, Abbott, and Hill (2010). The current paper adds speci-
ficity to such calls by focusing on how the role of ASGs can be transformed and 
reimagined.
The current case study focussed upon three colleges (X, Y and Z) in England, 
and each of the governing body’s composition is as shown in Table 1. Each had a 
single ASG, and the board’s activities were co-ordinated by a Chair and within a 
number of committees, some of which the ASGs contributed to.
Literature review
FE and educational governance
At the time of the current project, published research into the role of ASGs in 
English FE colleges appeared to be non-existent. The author had to expand the 
literature search beyond FE, to fields such as corporate governance and governance 
in schools, given the limited research in FE governance. School governance is 
explored because of a handful of highly pertinent, albeit dated, studies on teacher 
governor (TG) roles in schools (for example, Earley and Creese 2001); and cor-
porate governance for the scholarly views on staff involvement in governance and 
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board research. Using Fuller et al.’s (2013) definition, ‘governance’ in this study 
relates to structures and processes within the concerned FE colleges through which 
policies for the colleges’ education are developed, implemented and reviewed. This 
study focusses on the Academic Staff Governors’ involvement with such structures 
and processes within the governance of the three colleges.
The current study’s main focus is on ASG’s role and governing activities. 
Organisational ‘role’ is defined by Mullins (2004) as:
needed for analysis of behaviour in organisations. It explains the similar action of dif-
ferent people in similar situations within the organisation and the expectations held by 
other people. (Mullins 2004, 59)
The concept is given categorisation in Krantz and Maltz’s (1997) ideas of formal/
informal roles; and in James et al.’s (2007) distinguishing concepts of ‘roles-as-po-
sitions’ and ‘roles-as-practices’. Roles-as-positions are described formally in role 
descriptions and specifications. Roles-as-practices are the actual roles performed 
by governors as they understand based on their interpretations.
Following the work of several authors (for example, Hendry 2005; Zajac and 
Westphal 1996), van Ees, Gabrielsson, and Huse (2009) identified several useful 
concepts in a behavioural theory of corporation boards, which related to board 
members’ activities and included the concepts of bounded rationality, satisficing 
behaviour and routinisation of decision-making (RoDM). The current study bor-
rows these concepts for the purpose of studying ASG behaviour and what ASGs 
do in their governing roles. Bounded rationality, refers to the limited knowledge 
and potential incompetence of a governor in their role. Satisficing behaviour may 
apply to decision-making where a governor makes choices or forms judgements 
that are simply satisfactory instead of searching for optimal choices. Van Ees, 
Gabrielsson and Huse (2009, 312) describe RoDM as a past record or collection of 
‘successful solutions to problems that store and reproduce experientially acquired 
competencies, which can then be repeated over time’ by the board.
With regard to research into ASGs and TGs contribution to institutional deci-
sion-making, Earley and Creese’s (2001) governance study noted that the majority 
of school TGs did not have confidence in the governing boards’ overall deci-
sion-making processes, for instance, in setting Senior Management Team’s (SMT) 
pay; to some extent this could be linked to 22% of the TGs in the study being 
excluded from the decision-making process on such matters, perhaps, through 
Table 1. composition of the corporations of the three colleges, X, y and Z.
College
No. of gover-
nors No. of ASGs
No. of busi-
ness support 
staff
No. of 
student 
governors
No. of 
external 
governors
No. of com-
mittees
X 18 1 1 2 13 6
y 15 1 0 2 11 5
Z 20 1 1 2 15 6
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routinised practices such as excluding them from meetings when pay-related 
matters are discussed.
One of the main rationales for including ASGs in a governing body may be to 
do with the ASGs’ academic-related knowledge and experience. From the analysis 
of publicly available data on FE teachers’ profiles (Clow 2005), one can hypothesise 
that in a given college it is likely that governor candidates among teachers may 
possess relevant professional educational knowledge and experience, and can 
enrich the pool of expertise within the college governing body. However, influen-
tial governance researchers like Carver and Carver (2013) and Brennan, Kirwan, 
and Redmond (2016) insist on governors being external to the relevant institution. 
Furthermore, in educational governance, there may be some apprehension about 
academic ASGs’ expertise in non-pedagogic governance matters (New 1993b).
In terms of the governing arrangements in English FE, as of 2012, many col-
leges appeared to continue to use the 2007 version of the state-directed list of 
governor responsibilities despite a revamp of the responsibilities in the Education 
Act of 2011 (Table 2). Hill, Downs, and Drake (2012) inferred that the reason 
for the continuation of the state- directed instrument and articles of govern-
ance by the colleges was due to their measured adaptation of the changes in the 
2011 Act. Following the new statutory Education Act (HMSO 2011), the AoC 
(2013, 37) recommended adding a further responsibility for an FE college board, 
which required each college to support ‘the needs of the community(s) it serves’. 
Identification of such value-based responsibilities concurs with Stoker’s (2004, 
6) ‘localism’ approach, which strongly advocates colleges’ direct interaction with 
local stakeholders through ‘reason-giving, questioning and continuous exchange 
between the provider and the relevant public.’ However, issues of how this is 
practised may exist (Lea 2005).
Hill, Downs, and Drake (2012) found that while 80% or more colleges had 
their corporation chairs’ and principals’ responsibilities defined, only 62% had the 
roles defined for other governors such as ASGs. Even where governance purpose 
and responsibilities were clear, for some governors in the case study by Gleeson, 
Table 2. Fe college governors’ general responsibilities as of 2007 and the amendments in educa-
tion act (2011).
Governor responsibilities in DIUS (2007) Education act (2011)
determination and review of ed. char-
acter, mission and oversight of college 
activities
condensed to determination and review of educational 
character and mission and oversight 
of college
approving quality strategy effective/efficient use of resources, 
solvency of institution and safeguard-
ing assets
effective, efficient use and safeguarding of 
resources, solvency of college; 
approving finances; 
appointment, grading, suspension, dis-
missal of smt/staff
approving pay/conditions of smt/staff
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Abbott, and Hill (2010), the real issue in FE governance was, as also concurred 
by Cornforth and Edwards (1999), how to go about putting the responsibilities 
into practice, echoing Lea’s (2005) concerns. Gleeson, Abbott, and Hill (2010) and 
Cornforth and Edwards (1998) expound that governors from various backgrounds 
may have different priorities, understandings and expectations of their role.
ASGs’ activities in educational governance
In New’s (1993a) study into teacher voice in school governance, the authors 
observed that TGs’ contributions in meetings were limited and were categorised 
into several types, including the providing of ‘professional information’ and the 
presentation of staff viewpoints. Earley and Creese (2001) hypothesised that 
TGs may be interested only in matters of direct concerns to teachers, justifying 
a restricted professional model of TGs’ participation in governance. This was 
supported in Lee’s (2000) interviews with ASGs at four colleges in the Midlands. 
Earley and Creese (2001) found that TGs felt they were often excluded from the 
discussion of certain issues such as personnel, finance and salary matters. Such 
exclusion is evident in college boards too, as described in Lee’s (2000) work in 
college governance. Both of the studies referred to the direct exclusion of ASGs, 
which may be by the Chair asking the ASGs/TGs to leave meetings because of 
potential conflict of interest in relation to the meeting agenda item, or indirect 
exclusion because ASGs/TGs felt intimidated to contribute to meetings due to 
the presence of their SMT in the meetings. In both of the studies, the exclusion 
could also be regarded as self-inflicted because staff appeared to take an interest 
only in matters that related to the general staff.
According to James et al. (2012), both supporting and challenging the man-
agement are aspects of good governance. However, governors may often back the 
SMT rather than providing the necessary constructive challenge because they 
may belong to the same peer group as the SMT (Mace 1973). In FE, ASGs may 
see the role’s importance but some principals and governors may see the role 
as insignificant and ASGs’ contribution as of little value (Lee 2000). Chapman, 
Collinson, and Collinson (2009) observed that governors (including ASGs) do 
not challenge the principals and Wilkins (2014) hypothesised the reason for this 
may be ASGs’ affiliation with the SMT and that ASGs may find it difficult to make 
any meaningful contribution because decisions appear to be already made. Such 
empirical evidence, including research by Schofield, Matthews, and Shaw (2009), 
suggests that offering constructive challenge may be an area of concern in both 
school and FE governance in England, given that a ‘vibrant ethos of challenge, 
self-criticism and self-improvement’ is a ‘critical success factor for effective gov-
ernance’ (Matthews, Snell, and Chapman 2011, 3).
Earley and Creese’s (2001) findings showed that TGs were positive about gover-
nors who were involved with various school activities but that only 12 (5% of) TGs 
visited their schools regularly as governors. ASGs may also be ‘link governors’ in 
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boards. Gleeson, Abbott, and Hill (2009) defined a link governor as a ‘dispassionate 
but interested individual’ linked to a particular curriculum area under ‘intensive 
care’ because of its underperformance and that while such a governor may have 
limited knowledge of the curriculum area or of teaching, learning and assessment 
(TLA), he/she can help the college staff see things from a different perspective. 
Ofsted (2012a) reported that improving colleges may have link governors attached 
to all curriculum areas of the colleges.
Role confusion
A number of studies have revealed the confusion of ASG roles as a significant 
barrier in schools (Earley and Creese 2001; Taylor 1983). Cornforth and Edwards 
(1998), McNay (2002) and Lee (2000) found similar issues in FE governance. Hill 
(2012) advises that ASGs should participate in the collective responsibility of 
accomplishing the core functions stated in the college’s instrument of governance 
using ASGs’ knowledge of the college and its operational context. He believes 
‘accounting for how something works or doesn’t work in college’ (2012, 11) is 
not a governing activity and should consult the clerk when in doubt of the role. 
If boards follow LSIS (2012) advice that they should consult the general staff (as 
opposed to relying on the ASG) for staff perspectives on the college matters, then 
the pressure on ASGs to represent teachers may not arise, but it may restrict their 
role in governance.
Research methods
In the current multi-case study, more than one college was used in order to obtain 
sufficient data to provide insight into ASG roles. From Ofsted’s (2012b) records 
of ‘Outstanding’ FE colleges in England, 16 potential FE colleges were identified. 
E-mails sent contained requests of official permission from the college corporation 
clerks for the colleges’ participation in the research. The e-mails introduced the 
researcher and contained consent-specific information about the research project. 
Telephone conversations were held with the corporations’ clerks and/or the col-
lege principals to provide an overview of the project for the colleges to consider. 
Three colleges accepted to take part in the research and were set as the number 
of case studies. Some of the reasons for the 13 colleges declining the invitation to 
participate included inappropriate timing due to staff SMT relations and lack of 
time due to other urgent matters such as Ofsted inspections.
A draft cross-sectional survey (Fogelman and Comber, 2007:127) questionnaire 
focusing on the research questions was designed to obtain data from the ASGs and 
other governors at the colleges. It was designed using online software, Qualtrics® 
(2002), and e-mailed to the governors via the clerks. The semi-structured nature 
of the questionnaire allowed the researcher to use respondents’ own variables in 
the subsequent methods, adding to the reliability of the study. The questionnaire 
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was based on comparable studies (Earley and Creese 2001; Gleeson, Abbott, and 
Hill 2010; Sodiq 2012) that had sought to collect perceptions of school and college 
governors.
The observation method was included in the study to address the first research 
question about ASG role-specific activities, to triangulate data (Bush 2007) and 
further explore emerging themes from the survey. The observation instrument 
(data and evidence collecting grid), containing space to record evidence from 
observed governance meetings, was used to collect information such as meeting 
attendees and layout of the meeting rooms, and ASGs’ verbal contributions in 
meetings.
Six face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted, with an ASG and 
another governor from each college. The interviews focused on the emerging the-
oretical ASG concepts from the initial data analysis of the questionnaire responses 
and ASGs’ contributions in the observed meetings. Once the first draft schedule 
was ready, it was used in the pilot study. The focus of the interview schedules for 
the ASGs was generally similar to the non-ASG interview schedules, but some spe-
cific questions allowed ASGs to make retrospective-meaning making (Patterson 
and Marshall 2014) of their own meeting contributions and governance experi-
ences. The interview questions were broadly categorised into ASGs’ governance 
activities and the understanding of ASG roles. During the interviews, a guide 
approach was followed but still allowing a degree of freedom for the interviewees.
The governance documents sought for analysis were lists of governors; 
Instruments and Articles of Governance; Standing Orders; Terms of Reference 
for observed committees; corporations’ self-assessment reports; Ofsted inspection 
reports and agendas and minutes of observed and preceding/subsequent meetings.
Findings and discussion
ASGs’ general governance activities
From the analysis of the evidence set, it appears that despite the presence of gen-
eral specifications for role responsibilities for all governors, in practice what role 
the ASGs performed, roles-as-practices (James et al. 2007), was shaped by the 
ASGs’ position as insiders and influenced by other insiders such as the SMT and 
the Chair of Governors. In this project, the 3 ASGs declared their behaviour of 
consulting SMT or the Chair of governors outside meetings. ASG at X- College 
said in the interview:
I would never do anything to deliberately embarrass the college, I would, as I have done 
before, I had gone to the Chair and said look, I’ve seen this in one of the governance 
papers. This is one of the questions that I want to ask, if it will cause embarrassment 
and she said no, you can ask that. (X-ASG; interview)
Similarly, Y-ASG (ASG at Y-College) confessed that he would ‘go to the Principal’s 
office and say ‘what’s going on?’; and Z-ASG thought it would be ‘unfair’ to con-
front SMTs at meetings, before him raising the relevant issue in person regarding 
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difficult governance matters that needed querying. This observation is relevant 
to the issue raised by Carver and Carver (2013), where the authors express doubt 
about the benefits of including staff in governance to monitor their employers’ 
performance, due to undue influence and conflict of interest.
It surfaced that ASGs may not have the space and support for performing some 
of the general governance roles that other governors may perform, for instance, 
contributing to staffing or remuneration discussions. At X-College, the instrument 
of governance barred ASGs from being involved in the remuneration commit-
tee. However, X-ASG confessed in the interview that in one of the corporation 
meetings, she had argued for a pay award for SMT at a time the public sector was 
experiencing financial difficulties because she believed the SMT was helping the 
college perform. Interestingly, the survey data across the three colleges showed 
that setting staffing pay and SMT pay were seen the least relevant activities for 
an ASG. In the questionnaire, in a spectrum of relevance from 0 to 5 identifying 
relevant governance activities for an ASG, reviewing the college’s mission was 
ranked by governors across the three colleges at 4.4 out of 5, while staffing pay was 
ranked at only 2.2 and SMT pay and conditions at just 1.9. This suggested that the 
governors did not believe it was necessary for ASGs to get involved in pay-related 
decision-making processes. A common argument for such exclusion, featured in 
the interview with the Vice-Chair, is that such an approach is adopted to protect 
ASGs from being put in a difficult position. However, it is possible to contest this 
argument with the view that ASGs’ opinion may be a significant resource even in 
discussion of financial matters because of their understanding of education mat-
ters and the close link between finance and other resources, and TLA – a point 
highlighted by Z-ASG and the curriculum committee chair at X-College. Across 
the three colleges, all three ASGs were barred or discouraged from participating 
in the boards’ remuneration committees, which meant they could not influence 
staff and SMT’s pay and conditions significantly. This was in line with Masunga’s 
(2014) finding in FE colleges.
Further analysis of interview data suggested that some governance deci-
sion-making may by-pass whole boards as found in X and Y colleges affecting 
ASGs’ roles-as-practices (James et al. 2007). At one of the colleges, the ASG 
described how, in an annual strategy meeting, the SMT manoeuvred the agenda 
away from the governors’ recommendations to favour SMT’s pre-emptive deci-
sion-making. At another college, the ASG was frustrated how one SMT left the 
college without the board’s knowledge and a college restructure that had taken 
place without any discussion at governance level. In these situations, it was dif-
ficult to see how the board, let alone the ASG, could contribute meaningfully to 
governance.
There were some examples where ASGs were seen to make an impact. ASGs’ 
identification with their local communities encouraged ASGs to engage with local 
community issues. For instance, X-ASG being a member of the local community 
raised concerns about the impact of the college’s academy building projects on 
146   A. SODIQ AND I. ABBOTT
locals and schools in the area. At Y-College, Y-ASG as a member of the ethnic 
community was observed in a meeting taking a lead role in promoting the college 
among the ethnic community. Similarly, Z-ASG raised the issue of mental health 
issues among young people in the community and pressed the Principal to make 
attempts to identify students with mental health issues at enrolment point so that 
early support could be provided. These instances of community-related contri-
butions for the ASGs reflected a ‘localism’ approach to FE governance argued for 
by Stoker (2004, 6). They also present a multi-dimentional aspect of ASGs’ roles, 
where their educational expertise and experience interact with their other interests 
and passion to contribute to governance – an approach that the current paper 
argues for in a reimagined ASG role in FE governance. However, the concept of 
bounded rationality in decision-making (van Ees, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2009; 
Hendry 2005) could hinder such efforts. Bounded rationality is the idea that in 
practice governors may not have enough resources to make the optimum deci-
sions. In the real world, resources such as time and knowledge may not always 
be sufficient affecting governance of institutions. For instance, at X-College, in 
the board self-assessment processes for two consecutive years (2012/2013 and 
2013/2014), governors raised the issue of not knowing how to go about meeting 
the needs of the community.
A finding drawn from the analysis of the 3 ASGs’ contributions in their gov-
ernance meetings was that, overall, their contributions tended to be in support of 
SMTs’ positions or decisions, rather than challenging SMT. Across the three col-
leges, 38% (16) of meeting contributions supported SMTs’ inputs. This was twice 
the number of challenges (19%; 8). All of the ASGs’ supporting contributions were 
from the ASGs at X and Y colleges and none came from the ASG at Z-College. At 
the same time, Z-ASG’s total contributions to meetings were significantly fewer 
compared with the other two ASGs. X-ASG was seen to comment/ask questions 
in 27 instances in three meetings and Y-ASG in 11 instances in three meetings. 
In contrast, Z-ASG made only four contributions in two meetings, one of which 
was his challenge to the principal regarding mental health screening of students 
at enrolment, described earlier.
X-ASG’s supportive contributions included nodding in an open and visible 
manner when the SMTs were delivering their reports on various governance top-
ics. In the interview she explained such non-verbal gestures were to show the rest 
of the governors that she was in agreement with the SMTs’ reports and give her 
backing to some of the points they were making. Her challenges included her 
questioning the strength of the audit reports’ claims that IT audit results were 
communicated to the curriculum areas because in her experience, this was not 
the case in practice.Y-ASGs’ supportive comments included him supporting the 
principal’s assertion to the governors that there were robust systems in place to 
support underperforming teachers. His single challenge put forward was directed 
at the Principal discussing the public dissemination of marketing information with 
performance statistics showing the college’s recent achievements nationally – an 
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action both the Principal and Y-ASG supported. Nevertheless, Y-ASG gently chal-
lenged the Principal and emphasised how the marketing information would entice 
members of the local community into considering the college for their education:
Y-ASG:  I just think the local Imam would be reading something out and putting 
something up [referring to the college’s blurb on its achievements]. Because 
I just think this is what people go for. They read it and they think, ‘Wow!’
Y-Principal:  It is mad – you’d have to be mad to go somewhere else [apart from the 
college].
Y-ASG:  If you say that they think you’ve got a vested interest, but if you actually show 
them, they can’t; this is the numbers. It’s amazing to show them – we beat 
some of the other colleges.
X-ASG asserted in her interview that in her role she did not just agree with 
everything the SMT or other governors say but added the caveat that she would 
not challenge them in a negative way. Indeed, the observation statistics showed 
that she had a more balanced approach to challenge and support in governance, 
compared with the other two ASGs. Regarding Y-ASG’s contributions, the Chair of 
the audit committee said, ‘I’ve certainly seen support for particular views or initia-
tives or recommendations’ but ‘challenge – not as much.’ In the case of Z-ASG, his 
position was that it was difficult to support or challenge SMTs. According to him, 
‘it puts you under pressure of not raising your head above the parapets’ because 
sometimes SMTs’ information to governors contradicted their information to the 
college staff. On the importance of support and challenge in governance, Ofsted 
(2012a) noted that at high performing colleges, governors could ‘challenge manag-
ers vigorously’ on the college’s performance but suggested that if the relationships 
between governors including ASGs and the SMT were too close, problems with 
governance would start to emerge.
Satisficing decision-making could explain why one governor might challenge 
a decision while the other might not as in the case of X-College’s SMT pay award 
decision in one of the corporation meetings. The external governor who chal-
lenged the award might have been underestimating X-SMT’s performance while 
X-ASG, who supported it, might have been overestimating their performance; 
both cases suggest some satisficing behaviour because of their lack of complete 
knowledge about the matter (bounded rationality). The rationale for suggesting 
such boundedness is that at least X-ASG was not party to the original discus-
sions as they had taken place in the remuneration committee, which X-ASG was 
excluded from; this was similar to the 22% of TGs excluded from some deci-
sion-making described in Earley and Creese (2001). Time was a bounded factor 
too in the final board discussion about SMT pay award, as revealed by another 
external governor, X-EXG4, in her interview. According to her, the award decision 
took about five minutes only, without much deliberation – an approach criticised 
by Avis (2009, 644) and dubbed as ‘technicisation’ of governance as much criticised 
in Hopkins’ (2014) deliberative and democratic governance.
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Another example of satisficing behaviour in ASGs’ decision-making was at 
Y-College, in the observed audit committee meeting, where Y-ASG supported 
the reappointment of financial auditors even though, as evident in the inter-
views, he had limited interest and involvement in the committee’s matters. The 
bounded rationality (van Ees, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2009; Hendry 2005) of finan-
cial knowledge might have led to the satisficing support for the reappointment. 
Satisficing decision-making might also explain Z-ASG’s suggestion and support 
for governors’ observations of teachers’ lessons during the annual strategy day. In 
fact, Z-ASG elaborated in the interview that his suggestion that governors observe 
lessons was not a good suggestion because, in hindsight, he could see that the 
timing would add unnecessary pressure on staff as the observations would take 
place during the college’s assessment period – an extremely busy time for teachers.
ASGs’ role-specific activities
ASGs’ role-specific governance activities included the highly valued role of pro-
fessional information giving using TLA knowledge and sometimes, academic 
subject-specific knowledge. In the questionnaires, the 3 ASGs revealed ASGs’ 
frequent reliance on their professional expertise when contributing to governance 
meetings. Moreover, 92% (32) of governors across the colleges were in agreement 
that ASGs helped the board to understand educational issues at their colleges. In 
the observed meetings, there was evidence of ASGs:
•  using teachers’ absenteeism statistics to support and approve stricter sick-
ness policies;
•  challenging an SMT’s audit report highlighting its limited relevance to the 
curriculum;
•  asking questions of SMT to enlighten external governors;
•  highlighting IT equipment issues and their impact on the curriculum;
•  describing the colleges’ lesson observation and CPD arrangement for 
teachers;
•  advising governors how to use their time during college visits, for instance, 
conducting governors’ visits to lessons in a purposeful way.
One external governor captured the professional-information-giving role of an 
ASG by saying that their ASG was ‘very good at providing context’ in governance 
discussions around TLA matters. The study showed that ASGs’ professional infor-
mation may range from the highly valued knowledge such as an ASG’s awareness 
of learners’ educational needs to the comparatively less valued aspects such as 
ASGs management expertise (Figure 1).
College governors’ valuing of ASGs’ awareness of education contexts is in line 
with Masunga’s (2014) finding that understanding of an FE education system is 
an important characteristic of an FE governor. This finding is comparable with 
New’s (1993a) finding in school governance, where external governors doubted 
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if TGs were competent enough when discussing non-educational matters such 
as management affairs. ASG at Y-College did not believe a teacher had to be a 
manager before he/she could become an ASG. An audit committee chair at one of 
the colleges did not believe the need for college managers assuming ASG roles and 
could not explain why the colleges in the study had curriculum managers fulfilling 
ASG roles. At the same time, what is not clear is if college SMTs influenced college 
managers’ (rather than teachers’) appointment to ASG roles. Any reimaging of 
ASG roles may need to consider this possibility. This issue also highlighted a need 
for future research to establish if non-managerial academic staff/teachers were less 
likely than managerial academic staff to assume ASG roles in FE colleges, and in 
the education sector in general.
In terms of ASGs’ role in linking governance and TLA issues, to a limited extent 
ASGs appeared to participate in college visits such as graduation ceremonies, 
annual strategy days, as governors; some of which may be in their multiple roles as 
governors, managers and academic staff. The extent to which the 3 ASGs were able 
to distinguish these multiple roles during their visits differed from one another. 
X-ASG was very clear about her capacity in such visits unlike Y-ASG and Z-ASG. 
Comparing these findings with TGs at schools, in Earley and Creese’s (2001) study, 
only 12 (5% of) TGs were observed to visit their schools regularly as governors.
Another finding in the current research was that, even though ASGs wished to 
act as link governors to support underperforming curriculum areas, unlike the 
external governors, ASGs’ insiderness prevented them from playing such a role. 
This underlined the limited scope the ASGs were working in, where they were 
barred from contributing to the curriculum-related aspect of governance. It does 
raise questions as to how an ASG can perform their role using the full extent of 
their curriculum expertise as Hill (2012) has recommended, thus further laying 
down a case for a transformation of ASG roles in FE college governance.
Figure 1. Q13 – asGs’ most valued experiences, knowledge and skills across the three colleges.
150   A. SODIQ AND I. ABBOTT
Finally, although representing staff views in governance was seen as a relevant 
role, the governance arrangements did not allow such a role. In practice, Y-ASG 
appeared to perform this function at an informal level while being uncertain he 
had the remit to do so. He believed that an ASG was in a good position to rep-
resent staff interests and bring issues to governance for the greater good of the 
college’s education motives. To a limited extent, where it served the college’s TLA 
priorities (for instance, IT equipment issues and staff absenteeism), X-ASG too 
was seen to raise staff issues in meetings. In line with the variance in opinion and 
practice regarding this role between X and Y ASGs, 64% of X-College and 50% 
of Y-College governors believed their ASGs attempted to represent staff interests. 
At Z-College, only 16% of the board believed Z-ASG was acting on behalf of the 
staff. This was reflected in his interview where he asserted that representing staff 
interest was neither practical nor a credible role. This ambivalence regarding staff 
representation is in line with the findings in studies at colleges (Lee 2000) and 
schools (Earley and Creese 2001).
There was evidence of other professional activities arising from ASGs’ academic 
positions. For instance, X-ASG took a leading role in governor induction whereby 
she led the governors in college tours around curriculum areas giving governors 
a background for each area. In addition, her idea of inviting governors to the 
college’s teacher-CPD events seemed to have materialised into a formal training 
schedule for future training for the governors. Similarly, Y-ASG took a leading role 
in organising student and community-related events in governance, although he 
was dissatisfied about being given a regular additional role in less satisfying activi-
ties such as mere opening of external project bid applications in the regular tender 
evaluations. As for Z-ASG, he used his subject-specific professional knowledge in 
computing to comment on the viability of digitising governance documents for 
use in meetings. The authors are of the view that through skills audits of ASGs, 
boards could identify areas beyond TLA matters for ASGs to contribute to in FE 
governance in an expanded and transformed ASG role.
Understanding/confusion of the ASG role
It appears that in the three boards, what the governors perceived as role uncer-
tainty among ASGs did not always reflect the ASGs’ views. At Y-College, the 
governors did not believe Y-ASG was uncertain but Y-ASG confessed that it was 
not clear to him what the role entailed. Similarly, Z-College governors believed 
Z-ASG was uncertain but Z-ASG displayed a good understanding of the role. At 
all three colleges, the uncertainty of the role could be among the wider college 
staff too, according to all 3 ASGs. Factors that cause the uncertainty, according 
to the comments in the surveys, included the ASG appointment process. College 
staff elect ASGs but ASGs are officially barred from representing staff interests, 
according to the governing instruments. In practice, this may be difficult to enforce 
because of the close proximity of ASGs with other teaching staff, and this was 
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evident in Y-ASG’s case. ASG training-related issues and a lack of clarity arising 
from an absence of ASG role specifications could also be factors related to the 
understanding of the role.
Conceptualisation of ASG roles at the three FE colleges
The 3 RaPs framework of an ASG’s role in FE governance
In order to capture the themes of an ASG role emerging from the current study, a 
conceptual framework, named ‘The 3 RaPs (Roles as Position/Perceived/Practice) 
Framework of an ASG Role’, is proposed in Figure 2. The framework encompasses 
three facets of an ASG role in an FE college in England: roles-as-positions, roles-
as-perceived and roles-as-practices, labelled RaP1, RaP2 and RaP3 respectively. 
Roles-as-positions (RaP1), introduced by James et al. (2007), relate to the concept 
of formal role in an organisation as discussed by Krantz and Maltz (1997). For the 
ASGs in the current case study, RaP1 (formal roles) refer to the responsibilities that 
applied to all governors in each college and specified in the colleges’ instruments 
of governance. The current study showed that there were no role descriptions 
specific to ASGs – a situation similar to at least 38% of colleges, in Hill’s (2014) 
study. This study has shown that RaP1 at a college might incorporate ASGs’ rou-
tine exclusion from certain committees such as remuneration committees due to 
RoDM (van Ees, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2009).
The second facet of an ASG role may be conceptualised as roles-as-perceived 
(RaP2), a facet advanced as a product of the current research to link James et 
al.’s (2007) two concepts of roles-as-position and roles-as-practices. Lee (2000) 
Figure 2. conceptualisation of asG role: the 3 RaPs framework.
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observed a discrepancy between how roles are understood and practised. This dis-
crepancy could be conceptualised in terms of RaP2, a transitional phase between 
roles-as-positions (RaP1) and roles-as-practices (RaP3), both of which correspond 
to the job specifications of the role and how the role is implemented by an ASG. 
RaP2 encompasses aspects that influence roles-as-practices and interpretations 
and understanding of RaP1 in formal documents.
RaP2 can also be characterised by stakeholders’ expectations and perceptions 
of the role (Mullins 2004). At the three colleges in this study, there was evidence 
of the governors expecting ASGs to represent staffs’ interests or views, which may 
potentially affect the actual role activities practised (RaP3; see below). Negative 
perceptions of an ASG’s role by leaders (Lee 2000) or perceptions among gover-
nors as to the value of the role and what constitutes the role (Earley and Creese 
2001; New 1993a) could both influence RaP3. At colleges Y and Z, the ASGs felt 
their role was not valued by the board and/or the SMT and this negative image 
could affect the role. Some may perceive and highlight ASGs as insiders within 
the college as evident in the current research. This too could affect room for ASGs’ 
influence (Mace 1973), as it has been seen in the 3 ASGs’ potential to participate 
in staff and SMTs’ remuneration related issues; ASGs’ ability to support/challenge 
SMTs in meetings; and their potential to contribute to governance.
Role understanding represented in RaP2 could also influence RaP3. In addition 
to the issue of the absence of ASG role specification (RaP1), factors that could 
influence ASG roles include how the role is interpreted by ASGs and others; role 
uncertainty associated with training; ASGs holding multiple roles at the colleges; 
and conflict between how ASGs and stakeholders such as staff see the role and 
what is expected of the role by governance arrangements.
The third and final gear in the framework in Figure 2 represents James et al.’s 
(2007) roles-as-practices (RaP3). In the current research, this concept encom-
passes the actual activities the ASGs were observed to be engaged in, in their 
governance role. The current study found that statutory activities formed the bulk 
of ASGs’ RaP3 activities. Key observations of the nature of the RaP3 activities 
included:
•  ASGs consulting SMT or corporation chair informally in governance 
matters;
•  some tendency for ASGs to consider the community’s needs but role affected 
by limited expertise which may correspond to van Ees, Gabrielsson, and 
Huse’s (2009) organisational reality of bounded rationality;
•  generally more support from ASGs for SMT than challenging them; ASGs’ 
contributions to decision-making may be affected by their satisficing 
behaviour where the most immediate need may be considered rather than 
considering issues thoroughly;
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•  contributions in meetings using TLA-specific expertise; and sometimes 
other expertise derived from academic subject specialism, community or 
student links;
•  ASGs tended to be members of curriculum/quality committees but mainly 
barred from remuneration and search committees; this pattern and restric-
tion shaped and limited their governance roles and activities, despite their 
potential to contribute to non-TLA matters in a reimagined ASG role;
•  some evidence of ASGs representing staff views and interests; and
•  ASGs visiting college areas to conduct governing activities but no evidence 
of them acting as link governors for specific curriculum areas.
In terms of symmetry between ASG role types, RaP1 to RaP3, in reality there 
may be discrepancies between the role aspects for a given ASG. This is denoted 
in Figure 2 by the arrows showing distance/contact between the gears containing 
each of the types of roles. When the gears are not in contact, they represent a situ-
ation where ASG roles may have room for improvement for effective governance. 
For instance, it was noted that college governors regarded ‘meeting the needs of 
the community’ as a highly relevant activity for ASGs (RaP2). In practice, how-
ever, this function was observed only in 26% of the 3 ASGs’ contributions (RaP3). 
Similarly, at all three colleges, governors did not recognise ASGs’ management 
experience or managerial status as relevant or useful to the role (RaP2), but in 
practice all 3 ASGs were managers (RaP3). In addition, ASGs’ potential to rep-
resent staff views was recognised as a valued aspect (RaP2) but the instruments 
of governance (RaP1) at the colleges did not allow such a role. Another example 
is that, at Y-College, governors felt that the ASG had a clear understanding of 
the role (RaP2) but Y-ASG admitted to his uncertainty of the role and at times 
engaged in activities that represented staff interests at an informal level (RaP3).
In optimal governance, the 3 RaP ‘gears’ would be in harmony and contain 
information that complements one another, instead of contradicting concepts 
of the ASG role. The harmony may be helped through training for governors on 
ASG roles; the presence of ASGs’ role specifications in articles and instruments 
of governance, which are informed by regular evaluation of RaP3 activities; and 
using knowledge and expertise shared by governance collaborators in other sec-
tors such as schools, universities and corporate governance. In the framework, 
such information is represented by the dashed arrows. The authors believe in a 
reformed role, and such a harmonious model of ASG role would address Sallis’s 
(2006) description of the TG/ASG role as the most difficult role in an educational 
institution’s governing board.
Conclusion
The findings about ASG roles and the ASG role framework in the study could be 
applied in governance research in other colleges, or with modification, to other 
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educational contexts. The research suggests that there is much room to transform 
ASG roles and, as a result, for ASGs to play a significantly fuller role in educational 
governance. In order to facilitate this, several recommendations for governance 
practitioners can be identified from the case study:
(1)  FE corporations should introduce specific role descriptions for ASG 
roles in the articles of governance in order to aid role understanding.
(2)  In reimagining ASG roles and to address ASGs’ insiderness, it may be 
worth while considering Y-ASG’s and Z-ASG’s idea of discussing at least 
some governance issues in SMTs’ absence. This may encourage more 
contributions from ASGs, especially the necessary challenge to SMT’s 
proposals and plans and independent support from them, adding more 
autonomy to ASGs’ statutory roles in FE governance.
(3)  Another way of addressing ASGs’ insiderness is by providing them with 
opportunities to assume ASG governorships at other FE colleges, as 
opposed to at their own college.
(4)  FE governors’ training data could be included in national databases, 
such as AoC’s (2014) surveys, in order to publicise vital profile and gov-
ernance efficiency-related information. This could help boards focus 
more on responsibility for improving their practice through governor 
training – a characteristic of effective boards (Bartlett 2008).
(5)  A research methodological recommendation for future researchers in 
ASG roles is to observe ASGs on corporations’ strategy and/or training 
days, and in ASGs’ special governance tasks, in order to gather deeper 
and richer evidence related to ASG-role-specific activities. Through 
such research, the sector will be able to assess the impact on FE govern-
ance from a reimagined ASG role.
From the multi-site case study, and based on the opinion of various governors, 
it is clear that ASGs are unique in their capacity to bring the shop-floor TLA 
perspective to governance, as no other governors are in a position to present 
this perspective with the immediacy an ASG can. Within a reimagined model of 
ASG roles in governance, where consideration is given to the three aspects of the 
roles put forward in this paper (Role-as-Position, Role-as-Perceived and Role-
as-Practices), it may be easier to see how the ASGs’ potential to contribute to FE 
governance can be fully exploited.
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